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of his equipment and his inability to dodge through the forest undergrowth, did not have a chance for his life.[25]

The idea of Indians running down horses is not as incredible as it at first seems. In the heat of summer, when most of the fighting took place, the Spanish mounts tired quickly, especially after the long trip to the Indian ambuscade. Besides this, the Araucanians were accustomed to hunting wild game by literally chasing it to death. This required a tireless trot, at which they were proficient. Profiting by the lessons of their own strategy, the Araucanians devised an extremely light saddle in order to increase the endurance of their mounts on long rides. When they used captured Spanish saddles they first cut them down so as to make them considerably lighter.[26]

Shortly after the turn of the century, by 1611 to be exact, the Indians developed a cavalry that in terms of mobility was superior to the Spanish. They likewise possessed the best horses in the whole of Chile. These advantages were demonstrated in more daring raids on Spanish towns and a willingness to meet the Spanish cavalry on its own ground.[27] From this time forward the war passed into a new phase in which Araucanian offensive power became an increasingly significant factor. The source of that power, of course, lay in mastery of the horse. In little more than a generation the animal from which the Indians had once fled in terror had been incorporated into their culture, transforming it into a factor of defiant military power, dedicated to the eradication of Spanish culture. The Spaniards were not only dismayed to recognize this development of Araucanian military strength, but were piqued as well at the sight of barbarous savages riding horses with an air of equality. In answer to Spanish resentment the Indians pledged never to quit their war for freedom and their horses to enter serfdom on foot.[28]

The existence of a skilled and effective military force bespeaks the presence of a comparable political organization under whose genius it is formed and directed. In the development of Araucanian political organization the chronicles indicate two major forces at work: the geographical particularism in which the Araucanians traditionally lived and a counter-force provoked by the presence of the enemy and inclining towards Araucanian unity. Throughout the first century

25 Marmolejo, pp. 40-43, 47-49. These are but representative of many such descriptions.

26 Nájera, pp. 42, 110-116. Cooper (p. 704) gives the impression that Indian saddles and riding gear were nothing more than crude imitations of Spanish models.

27 Nájera, pp. 107-110; "Informe de Juan de Xaraquemada," May 1, 1611 (Gay, II, p. 239); Xaraquemada to King, Jan. 29, 1611 and Jan. 28, 1612 (*idem*, pp. 247, 255-257); Alonso García Ramón to King, 1613 (*idem*, p. 267).

28 Nájera, p. 116. Whenever the Indians found it necessary or advisable to grant a temporary peace, the Spaniards first insisted that they turn in their horses and move about on foot, as subject persons were expected to do. The Indians invariably turned in their *rocinantes*, keeping their good stock hidden for use after the next rebellion (*idem*, p. 128).

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of conquest ancient localism clashed with incipient nationalism. This conflict produced a political ambivalence which in itself contributed heavily to the cause of Araucanian independence. Centralization of politico-military authority was achieved to a point where successful resistance was possible, but did not develop to a stage where the Spaniards could defeat and usurp it.

The center of anti-Spanish unity was founded in what the Spanish termed "*el estado.*" This was a geographical expression signifying the area that Valdivia held in personal encomienda.[29] It was these Indians, particularly those of Arauco, Tucapel, and Purén, who planned and carried out the revolt of 1553, and who assumed leadership of the resistance movement. After the first few years of bitter warfare the Spaniards began to imbue the term estado with political connotations, hence Don Alonso de Ercilla's image of "*el estado indómito*" was much more than a flight of poetic fancy.[30]

It is virtually certain that the Indians, in pre-Hispanic days, were in the habit of seeking transient familial and friendship alliances in the conduct of war between localities. Upon their first major defeat by Valdivia, following which he recrossed the Biobío and founded Concepción, the more intelligent Indian leaders voiced a wide call to arms.[31] The resulting alliance was effective in that it led to the downfall of Valdivia, but it had no permanent character. With each new Spanish thrust the caciques of the estado had to reform alliances and seek wider support for their efforts. In 1556, for example, Lautaro and the chiefs established relations with the Indians of Santiago, attempting to incite them to rebellion.[32] Temporary alliances were both frequent and effective. In search of allies the chiefs used glass beads, dogs, and various types of Spanish plunder to effect

29 Olaverría, p. 20. The area included the Indian localities of Talcamavida, Laucamilla, Catiray, Marigueño, Angol, Arauco, Andalicán, Tucapel, and Purén. After the estado had been recognized as a political entity the term was applied to all or part of it. In essence, the term estado came to mean the center of Indian resistance, whether it embraced all of the above named provinces or merely one of them.

30 Alonso de Ercilla y Zúñiga, ed., José Toribio Medina, *La Araucana* (5 vols., Santiago, 1910). Historians and anthropologists seem to be under a strange compulsion to use this poem as a prime documentary source. This is not to say that in select instances the practice is not warranted, but the wide use to which it has been put must certainly be held in question. Everyone knows that there is much truth in it, although seldom is it possible to determine precisely where it resides.

31 Marmolejo, pp. 22-23. It took nearly three years to organize the first rebellion. It is sometimes implied that the Araucanians were introduced to coöperative military effort on a large scale through attempted invasions by the Incas. This seems most unlikely because the Incas were held at the Maule River, and the Indians occupying this area, as nearly as can be ascertained, were the warlike Promaucaes, who were not Araucanians. Nor could the Inca invasions have had anything to do with the formation of the estado, since, as we have seen, it was created by the imposition of Spanish dominion, without which it could have had no meaning.

32 *Idem*, pp. 61-62.

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Chilean citizens, though, the Mapuche also have a series of rights and obligations irrespective of reservation status which brings them under the jurisdiction of national courts, the authority of which is backed by the Chilean police force, military organization, and penal institutions. Nevertheless, the question of land rights (corporate *vs.* severalty status) is central to Mapuche political organization. It is largely as title holder of reservation land that the chief enjoys political leadership. It is membership in a reservation community that conditions the individual's political interests and goals. The eventual disposition of reservation land continues to be the primary issue around which Mapuche-Chilean relationships center in the political sphere of social action. The preamble to the contemporary condition may be stated in historical terms.

For more than 300 years after the Spanish invasion of Chile the Mapuche maintained considerable autonomy over the region south of the Bío Bío River. Horacio Lara (1889:241) expressed himself on this matter in the following words: "La Araucanía seguía prestandose a la faz del mundo como una sección territorial independiente de nuestra República, con sus costumbres y su independencia propria. . . ." But toward the end of the colonial era a series of forts and towns was re-established south of the Bío Bío—Los Angeles, Nacimiento, Antuco, and Santa Barbara were founded between 1742 and 1758. South of the Mapuche stronghold, Osorno, San Pablo, and Río Bueno were established with the effect of delimiting the southern extension of Mapuche-held territory. These towns did not serve as jumping-off points for immediate settler penetration of the Indian zone, however.

While little is really known about the details of Mapuche politico-military organization during most of this long era, the fact that they were able to resist white settlement of their heartland suggests an organization that could be called into play when the occasion demanded. It must not be overlooked, though, that they had the advantage of sheer weight of numbers, which, perhaps more than tactical maneuvers and organizational ability, accounts for their successful resistance. Also, because of a lack of centralized political authority, the Spaniards and later the Chileans were forced to conquer one small residential aggregate after another, the defeat of one such group not entailing the submission of the rest. In any case, the long-range successes of the Mapuche were always at the expense of

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175 648 the stability of local residential groupings throughout the colonial and early republican periods.

By the 1850's there was increased colonization of the southern part of central Chile. Several towns were also built near and along the Pacific coast south of Concepción. Nueva Imperial was founded in 1852 and Toltén in 1867. South of Villarrica and Valdivia a number of settlements were also established. In this same period the provinces of Arauco and Llanquihue were created. Through immigration from Europe and the northern provinces of Chile white population increased to more than 100,000 by the end of the nineteenth century in this part of Chile. The greatest impetus to colonization came after the War of the Pacific and after the pacification of the Mapuche. McBride described the settlement of Araucanía in these words: "Small blocks of territory, chiefly in the foothills of the Andes and in the deeper forests, still harbored clusters of Indian families who clung to their native speech, apparel, and customs. But white settlement was spreading. New provinces were created: Bío Bío in 1875, Malleco and Cautín in 1887—thus the whole of the Frontera was incorporated into the national domain" (1936:295–96). I might add that large blocks of Mapuche continue to live in the Central Valley on land now cleared of forest. With the establishment of reservations, the Mapuche were effectively brought under the administration of the national government and were influenced by its political and legal systems.

C42 [114] It is my feeling that most if not all the speculative reconstructions of prereservation political organization have to be dismissed, largely because the early chroniclers and even the more sophisticated ethnographers of the late nineteenth century saw Mapuche social and political organization in terms of European models founded on territorial units which seem to have no basis in fact. Cooper (1946), from whom the following excerpts are taken, gives an unbiased appraisal of the historical material on military and political organization:

[643] [613] [622] Some major features of the system . . . are quite clear. There was no peacetime over-all chief, no centralization of authority. . . . Furthermore, such authority as was invested in kinship heads and local "chiefs" was very limited—exclusively or almost exclusively consultative and persuasive, with little or no coercive power. They had no recognized rights to inflict punishment, to claim tribute or personal service, or to demand obedience from their kinsfolk or "subjects." The latter paid no attention to them and did as they pleased if the leaders showed themselves arrogant or domineering [724].

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Decisions regarding peacetime affairs and warlike undertakings were usually made in conferences of the responsible men and subheads at the house or meeting-ground of the head or "chief" after free expression of views and by common agreement. There was a certain loose hierarchy of honor and status (rather than authority proper) embracing higher and lower heads and "chiefs" — which brings us to the less clear features of the . . . sociopolitical structure [725].

In the course of time, particularly after the beginning of the 19th century, a certain increase in the executive and judicial power and authority accrued to peacetime headmen . . . and the earlier atomistic peacetime political structure assumed somewhat greater unity, cohesion, and hierarchization. But the basic democratic forms and functions persisted largely intact [726].

In writing of law and legal procedure, Cooper has this to say:

The chief crimes recognized were adultry and wife-stealing, murder, theft, homicidal sorcery, and treason. The offended party and his kin dealt with the offender; in earlier times headmen and other caciques had little or no authority to try cases or to pronounce judgment. Adultery, murder, and sorcery were punishable by death, and sometimes were actually so punished; but more commonly, in cases of adultery and murder, composition was resorted to, with payment of strings of llankas . . . [726].

Today, certain behavior is defined as extralegal by Chilean standards, serious departures from national law being handled by Chilean institutions empowered to enforce law and order. The Mapuche go to law for the settlement of disputes involving certain crimes and torts, but within the reservation community traditional sanctions deal effectively with other antisocial acts of a different nature. Most important among these are the ones which involve sorcery and which the Chilean courts usually refuse to consider seriously. Ostracism, ridicule, and the threat of sorcery continue as sanctions on most if not all reservations and larger communities. In certain instances, therefore, the Mapuche "take the law into their own hands," applying traditional moral principles in the ordering of social action. But matters involving property and personal rights not capable of being dealt with by traditional means are ultimately resolvable by recourse to the Chilean system of courts and law-enforcement agencies.

MAPUCHE: "PEOPLE OF THE LAND"

After the declaration of Chilean independence in 1810, the new national government assumed responsibility for colonizing the Mapuche stronghold south of the Bío Bío River. In general, the republican government's efforts followed the pattern established during the

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the Chileans and the Mapuche were for a long time deterrents to the loss of the chief's authority over his reservation group. To a certain extent this may be said to be operative still in times of crisis.

In parts of Araucanía where there is less pressure on land and where *división* is not a subject which is hotly contended among the reservation population, chieftainship is noticeably stronger in the economic sphere. Communal labor is more frequent and carried out on a larger scale. Communal land is used for grazing and gathering wood and is still under the jurisdiction of the chief. If an individual wishes to clear communal woodland for the purpose of farming it, permission has to be granted. In these matters there is an informal conclave of elders who make the decisions, but the chief is their spokesman and the official arbiter. The individual resident has a recognized right to continue his petition in the hope of swaying the leader's opinions by showing cause.

Significant modifications have taken place in Mapuche social structure since the imposition of a Chilean administrative system. Reservation social structure is qualitatively different from that of prereservation times. Before the period of peaceful reservation living, sociopolitical units fluctuated or changed in size. Since the imposition of reservation restrictions a greater population stability has come about, communities made up of unrelated kingroups have evolved, and reservation leadership has acquired political aspects over and above kinship allegiance.

Stated differently, the characteristic prereservation social unit was a kinship rather than a political group. For the most part it was a small, autonomous domestic unit. In establishing reservations the Chilean government attempted to follow this traditional social alignment. We have seen, however, that reservations were composed of dominant kingroups and one or more remnant groups of nonrelatives. This situation really approximated the Mapuche wartime organization, rather than the normally highly segmentary structure characterized by weak leadership in the hands of a *lonko*. So today's reservations continue to comprise a congeries of small communities which, in the framework of colonial administration, are essentially autonomous political groups with respect to one another.

Although the Chilean government legislates with regard to all reservations as a totality, it deals in most matters under the law with individual reservations, for example when a petition for *división* is made, or with individual persons, such as when credit is sought by